

Kant on Various Key Features of his Critical Project (from various of his writings)

1. [A]pprehension as sensations, reproduction as imaginings [*Einbildungen*], recognition as concepts. (KGS XVIII §5636, 1780-3; see also section titles in A deduction and KGS XV §228, 1790s)

2. The *Critique* admits absolutely no endowed (*anerschaffene*) or innate *representations*; all without exception, whether they belong to intuition or to concepts of the understanding, it regards as *acquired*. There is, however, also an original acquisition (as the teachers of natural right express themselves), consequently that which previously did not exist at all and thence belonged to nothing before this act. So it is, the *Critique* maintains, *firstly* with the form of things in space and time, *secondly* with the synthetic unity of the manifold in concepts; for our cognitive faculty does not derive either of these from the objects as given in themselves within them, but brings them into being a priori out of itself. However, there must still be in the subject a ground for this which makes it possible for the representations thus thought to arise so and not otherwise, and yet be capable of being related to objects that have yet to be given. This ground at least is *innate* . . . Herr Eberhard says (p. 390) "the grounds of the universal yet undetermined images of space and time, and with them is the soul created (*erschaffen*)." But on the following page he is again uncertain whether by the form of intuition (better would be: the ground of all forms of intuition) I mean the *limits* of the cognitive faculty or these *images* themselves... [But] where have I ever called the intuitions of time and space — wherein images are first of all possible — images themselves? (Images always presuppose a concept of which they are the *exhibition*, e.g. the undetermined image for the concept of a triangle for which neither the relationship of the sides nor the angles are given.) . . . The ground of the possibility of sensory intuition is neither of the two, neither *limit* of the cognitive faculty nor *image*; it is the mere *receptivity* peculiar to the mind, when affected by something (in sensation), to receive a representation conformably to its subjective constitution (*Beschaffenheit*). This first formal ground alone, e.g. of the possibility of a space intuition, is innate, not the space representation itself. For it always requires impressions in order first to determine the cognitive faculty to the representation of an object (which always is its own act). Thus arises the formal *intuition* one terms space as an originally acquired representation (the form of outer objects generally), the ground of which (as sheer receptivity) nevertheless is innate, and the acquisition of which long precedes determinate concepts of things which conform to this form. The acquisition of the latter is *acquisitio derivativa* because they presuppose universal transcendental concepts of the understanding. These concepts of the understanding too are not innate but acquired, but their *acquisitio*, like that of space, is also *originaria* and presupposes nothing innate other than the subjective conditions of the spontaneity of thought (conformity with the unity of apperception). (*On A Discovery*, Ak 221-3; see also *Critique of Practical Reason*, Beck translation p. 146f., KGS XVIII §4851, §4894, and §5637)

3. Space and time, as conditions of the possibility of how objects may be given to us, are valid only for objects of the senses, and therefore only for experience. Beyond these limits, they represent nothing whatever; for they are present only in the senses and have no reality outside them. The pure concepts of the understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to objects of intuition in general, be they similar or own or not, just so long as the intuition is only sensible, not intellectual. (B148)

4. The ground of the peculiarity of our understanding that unity of apperception arises a priori only by means of the categories, and only by such and so many, is as little capable of being specified as that why we have just these and no other functions of judgment, or why time and space are the only forms of our possible intuition. (B145f.)

5. Besides space there is no other representation which is subjective and related to something outer that can be called a priori objective. For from no other such representation than space can synthetic a priori propositions be derived. Hence, strictly speaking, there pertains to these other representations no ideality, even though *they precisely agree with the representation of space in that they belong merely to the subjective constitution of our mode of sense (Sinnesart), e.g. of sight, hearing, feeling.* Through sensations of colors, sounds, and warmth no object proper (*an sich*) can be cognized, least of all a priori. (B44)

6. That in the representation of an object which is merely subjective, i.e. constitutes its relation to the subject and not the object, is its aesthetic constitution . . . In the sensory representation of things outside me, the quality of space in which we intuit them is the merely subjective [aspect] of their representation . . . However, leaving aside its merely subjective quality, space is nevertheless an element in the cognition of things as appearances. *Sensation* (here the outer [sort]) likewise expresses the merely subjective [quality] of our representations of things outside us, but properly pertains to their material (real) [side], just as space expresses the mere a priori form of the possibility of their intuition. The former is nevertheless also used in the cognition of objects outside us. (*Critique of Judgment*, Introduction VII)

7. Were anyone to suggest a middle course between the two aforementioned, namely, that the categories are neither *self-thought* a priori first principles nor products of experience, but subjective dispositions of thought implanted in us from the beginning of our existence, which our Creator has so arranged that their employment exactly accords with the laws of nature by which experience unfolds (a kind of *preformation system* of pure reason), . . . then, in such a case, the categories would lack the *necessity* which belongs essentially to their conception . . . This is exactly what the skeptic wishes most of all. For, in that case, all the insight obtained through the supposed objective validity of our judgment is rank illusion, and people would not be wanting who would refuse to acknowledge this subjective necessity (which has to be felt). At the very least, one could not quarrel with anyone about what depends solely on the way his subject is organized. (B167)

8. Nothing is actually given to us except perception and the empirical advance from this to other possible perceptions. For, in themselves, appearances, as mere representations, are actual only in perception, which is in fact nothing other than the actuality of an empirical representation, i.e. appearance. To call an appearance an actual thing prior to perception either means that we are bound to meet with such a perception in the course of experience, or it means nothing. (A493/B521)

9. All representations have a necessary relation to a possible empirical consciousness; for if they did not have this, it would be utterly impossible to become conscious of them, and this is as much as to say they do not even exist. (A117n.)

10. All intuitions are nothing for us, and do not concern us in the least, if they cannot be taken up into consciousness and influence it either directly or indirectly — through this alone is cognition possible. (A116)

11. Without a relation to at least a possible consciousness, appearance could never be for us an object of cognition; and because it has no objective reality in itself and exists only in cognitions, it would be nothing. (A120)

12. Other forms of intuition than space and time, and likewise other forms of understanding than the discursive of thought or of cognition through concepts, even if they were possible, are entirely beyond our capacity to imagine and render comprehensible. (A230/B283)

13. Combination is representation of the *synthetic* unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity can therefore not arise out of combination; it rather is what first makes . . . combination possible by being added to the representation of the manifold. This unity, which precedes a priori all concepts of combination, is by no means the category of unity (§10); for all categories are grounded on logical functions in judgment, *and in these logical functions, however, combination, and thence unity of given concepts, is already thought*. Hence, the category already presupposes combination. We therefore must seek this unity still *higher*, namely *in that which itself contains the ground* of the unity of various concepts in judgment, and so the possibility of understanding *even in its logical employment*. (B131)

14. The first thought from which the faculty of representation proceeds is the intuition of itself and the category of the synthetic unity of the manifold, i.e. of pure (not empirical) representation which precedes perception under the a priori principle, how are synthetic a priori propositions possible? *The answer to which is: they are contained by way of identity in the unconditioned unity of space and time as pure intuitions...* — These forms [viz. space and time] lie a priori in the faculty of representation and are actually the real in the subject from which the cognition of the object can alone take place (*Forma dat Esse rei*). The possibility of a system of perceptions as belonging to the unity of experience is at the same time the ground of the coexistence of perceptions and succession of appearances which these can produce and which already have their place a priori in the understanding. — That the forms in the synthesis of intuition and the principles of its unity at the same time contain the *construction* of these concepts as in mathematics — this is an analytic proposition according to the principle of identity. No Theaetetus, no skepticism, can work against it. (*Opus Postumum*, II, p. 11)

15. How are synthetic a priori propositions, i.e. how is a metaphysics of nature possible? Answer: through the representation of objects in space and time (*coexistentia et successio*) as in one relationship of the subject to itself as an object within appearance, hence according to a formal principle of combination." Hegel seems to have grasped this point perfectly: "How are synthetic judgments possible a priori? The problem expresses nothing other than the idea that in the subject and predicate of the synthetic judgment — the former the particular, in the form of being, the latter the universal, in the form of thought — the heterogeneous are concomitant a priori, i.e. absolutely identical . . . One catches sight of this idea through the shallowness of the deduction of the categories. With respect to space and time, it is not where it ought to be, in the transcendental exposition of these forms, but only in the sequel, when, in the deduction of the categories, the original synthetic unity of apperception finally comes to the fore, and is recognized as the principle of figurative synthesis, or the forms of intuition [re: *formal intuitions*]; there, space and time are conceived as synthetic unities, and the productive imagination, i.e. spontaneity and absolute synthetic activity, as the principle of sensibility which previously had been characterized only as a receptivity. (Hegel, *Glauben und Wissen*, p. 297)

16. The *original* act of sense intuition of itself in the subject is at the same time valid for the object, because the latter can be given only through the former and the forms of space and time are identical with the combination of the manifold of these forms into a unity. (*Opus Postumum* II, p. 16)

17. All concept in general from which they may also take their material (*Stoff*) are reflected, i.e. representations employed in the logical relation of the plural validity (*Vielgültigkeit*). But there are concepts whose entire sense is nothing other than the subordination of representations as they occur to one or another reflection; they can be called concepts of reflection (*conceptus reflectentes*), and since all manner of reflection occurs in judgment, they are the sheer act of understanding which is applied to the [judgment] relationship and are to be comprehended, absolutely and intrinsically, as the ground of the possibility of judging. (KGS XVIII §5051, 1771)

The categories contain nothing more than the unity of reflection upon appearances insofar as they necessarily belong to a possibility empirical consciousness. (A310/B366-7)

18. Intuitions of the senses (in accordance with sensible form and matter) yield synthetic propositions which are objective. Crusius explains the real principle of reason according to a *systemate præformationis* (from subjective *principiis*); Locke according to *influxo physico* like Aristotle; Plato and Malebranche from *intuitu intellectuali*; we according to *epigenesis* from the use of natural laws of reason. (KGS XVII §4275, 1770)

Whether concepts are mere *educta* or *producta*. Preformation or epigenesis. *producta* either through physical (empirical) influence or through consciousness of the formal constitution of our sensibility and understanding on the occasion of experience, hence still *producta* a priori, not a posteriori. The doctrine of innate ideas (*ideis connatus*) leads to nonsense (*Schwärmerei*). *acquisitae* are a priori or a posteriori *acquisitae*. The former are not always intellectual. Thus, the division of cognition into sensitive and intellectual is not the first, but rather that into a priori and a posteriori. (KGS XVIII §4851, 1771)

The logical system of concepts of the understanding is either empirical or transcendental. The first is the system of Aristotle and Locke. The second that either of epigenesis or involution, acquired or innate (*erworben oder angebohren*). The so-called "sound understanding" is an *asylum ignorantiae*. (KGS XVIII §5637, 1780s)

If cognition is confined merely to objects of experience, it is not for that reason all derived (*entlehnt*) from experience, which involves pure intuition as well as pure concepts of understanding. There are thus elements of cognition in us which are met with a priori. Now, there are only two ways in which a necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects can be conceived: either experience makes possible these concepts or these concepts make possible experience. The first alternative may not take place where the categories (or pure sensory intuition too) are concerned; for they are a priori concepts, hence independent of experience (the affirmation of an empirical origin would be a kind of *generatio aequivoca*). Consequently, there remains only the other alternative, a system of the *epigenesis* of pure reason so to speak: namely, that the categories, from the side of the understanding, contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general. (B166f.)

If the teleological principle of generation . . . be assumed (as it must), one can take as its basis either *occasionalism* or *pre-establim*. According to the former, the cause of the world would, immediately and in conformity to its idea, give organic structure to materials at the occasion of coitus and their mixing together. According to the latter, the cause of the world would, in its wisdom, supply only the initial products by means of which an organic entity can reproduce a like entity, and the species maintain itself . . . Again, *pre-establim* can proceed in either of two ways. It considers the resembling entity produced by an organic being either as an *educt* or a *product*. The system of procreations as mere educts is called *individual pre-formation*, or *theory of evolution*; the system of procreations as products is called the system of *epigenesis*. This last can also be called the system of *generic pre-formation* because the productive capacity of the procreator would still be, in a virtual

sense, preformed in accordance with inner purposive designs which make it a member of that species, and thus the specific form. (*Critique of Judgment* §81)

Modern preformationism does not suffer from [the problems confronting early preformationisms], but it is still wrong. Modern preformationism — the blueprint theory — holds that the DNA in a fertilized egg is equivalent to a blueprint of the adult body. A blueprint is a scaled-down miniature of the real thing . . . You can represent a three-dimensional object such as a building by means of a set of two-dimensional slices: a ground plan of every floor, various elevation views, and so on. This reduction in dimensions is a matter of convenience. Architects could provide builders with matchstick and balsa-wood scale models of buildings in three dimensions, but a set of two-dimensional models on flat paper — blueprints — is easier to carry around in a briefcase, easier to amend, and easier to work from. A further reduction to *one* dimension is necessary if blueprints are to be stored in a computer's pulse code . . . The important point is that there is still a one-to-one correspondence between blueprint and building . . . There is a sense in which the blueprint is a miniaturized 'preformed' building . . . It is theoretically possible to transmit a scaled-down body via the one-dimensional digital DNA code. This doesn't happen but, if it did, it would be fair to say that modern molecular biology had vindicated the ancient theory of preformationism. Now to consider the other great theory of embryology, epigenesis, the recipe or 'cookery book' theory . . . A recipe is not a scale model, not a description of a finished cake, not in any sense a point-for-point representation . . . Embryonic development is a process. It is an orderly sequence of events, like the procedure for making a cake, except that there are millions more steps in the process and different steps are going on simultaneously in many different parts of the 'dish' . . . But now suppose we change one word in the recipe; for instance, suppose 'baking-powder' is deleted or is changed to 'yeast'. We bake 100 cakes according to the new version of the recipe, and 100 cakes according to the old version. There is a key difference between the two sets of 100 cakes, and this *difference* is due to a one-word difference in the recipes. Although there is no one-to-one mapping from word to crumb of cake, there *is* a one-to-one mapping from word *difference* to whole-cake *difference*. (Richard Dawkins, *The Blind Watchmaker*, pp. 294-7)

Space, represented as *object* (as actually is required in geometry), contains more than sheer form of intuition. It also contains a *comprehension* (*Zusammenfassung*) of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility in an *intuitive* representation, so that the *form of intuition* gives simply the manifold but the *formal intuition* gives unity of representation. In the Aesthetic, this unity was credited solely to sensibility only in order to note that it precedes all concepts, though to be sure it does presuppose a synthesis not belonging to the senses which yet first makes possible all concepts of space and time. For since through it (in that understanding determines sensibility) space and time are first *given* as intuitions, the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space and time, not to the concept of the understanding. (§24) (B160n.)

Space and time, and all their parts, are intuitions, and are, therefore, with the manifold which they contain, singular (*einzelne*) representations (*vide* Transcendental Aesthetic). They are thus not mere concepts, through which the very same consciousness is contained in many representations, but rather contain many representations in one, and in the consciousness of that representation; they are thus composite (*zusammengesetzt*). The *unity* of that consciousness is therefore *synthetic* and yet also *original*. This *individuality* of intuition has an important application. (*vide* §25) (B136n.)

[T]he determinations of inner sense must be ordered as appearances in time in exactly the same way we order those of outer sense in space. Hence, if we concede that we cognize objects only insofar as we are externally affected, we must admit of inner sense as well that we intuit ourselves only insofar as we are internally affected *by ourselves*; that is, concerning inner sense, we cognize our own subject only as appearance, but not according to what it is in itself. (B156)

But although extension, impenetrability, cohesion, and motion — in short, everything our outer senses can ever furnish to us — neither are nor contain thoughts, feeling, desire, or resolution (all things which are never objects of outer intuition), nevertheless, that something which underlies outer appearances, and so affects our sense that we obtain representations of space, matter, shape, etc. — that something, considered as noumenon (or, better, as transcendental object), might also be at the same time the subject of our thoughts — even though the way we are affected by it according to the manner of our outer sense yields us no intuitions of representations, will, etc., but merely of space and its determinations. This something is not, however, extended, impenetrable, or composite, because all these predicates apply only to sensibility and its intuition insofar as we are affected by certain (otherwise unknown) objects. None of the predicates of inner sense — representations and thought — are inconsistent with it. (A358f.)

In rational psychology, the unity of consciousness which underlies the categories is taken for an intuition of the subject as object, and to this the categories are applied. It is, however, only the unity in *thought*, by means of which alone no object is given... The subject of the categories cannot therefore obtain a concept of itself as an object of the categories by thinking them; for in order to think them, the pure self-consciousness which was supposed to be explained must be presupposed (*zum Grunde legen*). Equally, the subject in which the representation of time originally is grounded cannot determine its existence by means of time. (B422)

The *I think* is, as stated already, an empirical proposition, and contains the proposition, *I exist*, within it . . . It expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e. a perception (which proves that even sensation lies at its foundation, and that consequently this existential proposition belongs to sensibility). Yet, the *I think* precedes the experience which is to be determined through the category in respect of time, and the existence here is by no means the category, which relates not to an indeterminately given object, but only to one whose concept we already have and about which we wish to know whether or not it exists outside this concept. An indeterminate perception here signifies something real which is given solely to thought in general, and thus not as appearance nor yet as thing (*Sache*) in itself (noumenon), but something existing in fact (*in der Tat*), and in the proposition '*I think*' is designated as such. For it should be noted that if I have called the *I think* an empirical proposition, I did not mean thereby to say that the *I* in this proposition an empirical representation. Rather, it is purely intellectual because it belongs to thinking in general. By itself, in the absence of any empirical representation to provide the material, the act, *I think*, would not take place, and the empirical is only the condition for the application, or employment, of the pure intellectual faculty. (B422-3n.)

No psychologist has so much as even thought that the imagination might be a necessary constituent of perception itself. This is in part because that faculty has been restricted to reproductions, and in part because it has been supposed that the senses deliver to us not impressions alone but put together (*setzen zusammen*) these same impressions and bring to hand images of objects. Yet, there can be no doubt that outside of the receptivity of the impressions still something more is required, namely, a function for the synthesis of the impressions. (A120n.)

In my judgment, all depends on the fact that, in the empirical concept of the *composite* (*Zusammengesetzten*), the composition cannot be represented by means of the mere intuition and its apprehension but only through the self-active combination of the manifold given in intuition, and indeed in a consciousness in general (that is not again empirical). This combination and its function (*Funktion*) must stand under rules a priori in the mind which constitute the pure thought of an object in general (the pure concept of understanding), under which the apprehension must stand insofar as it constitutes *one* intuition and the condition of all possible experiential cognition of the

composite (in which there is a synthesis) or that pertaining to it, which is expressed through those principles. According to the way it is commonly conceived, the representation of the composite as such occurs, *as given*, along with the representation of the apprehended manifold, and accordingly does not belong — as it must — entirely to spontaneity, etc. (Letter to Beck of 16-17 Oct., 1792)

Cf. KGS XV §228 (1790s):

The entire sensory faculty of representation:

1. Sense (*facultas apprehendendi*):
 - a. Apprehension of the inner (*sensus internus*),
 - b. of the outer state,
 - c. of oneself (*apperceptio*).
2. Imagination (*imaginandi*):
 - a. *facultas reproducendi*,
 - b. *prævidendi*,
 - c. *fingendi*.
3. Faculty of Comparison (*comparandi*):
 - a. *ingenium*
 - b. *acumen*,
 - c. *facultas signandi*.

To begin with [there] belongs to experience: representations of the senses. Second consciousness; the latter, if it is immediately combined with the former is called empirical consciousness, and the representation (of the senses) combined with empirical consciousness is called perception. If experience were nothing more than an intuition of perception, nothing would be met with in it which would not be empirical in origin. (¶) By itself (*allein*) the consciousness of perceptions relates all representation only to ourselves as modifications of our state; they are then separate among themselves, and especially not cognitions of any thing and related to no object. (KGS XVIII §5923)

An empirical representation of which I am conscious is a *perception*; that which I think, in the representation of the imagination by means of the *apprehension* and *comprehension* (*comprehensio æsthetica*) of the manifold is *the empirical cognition of the object*; and the judgment, which expresses an empirical cognition, is *experience*... The imagination's act of giving an intuition to a concept is *exhibitio*. The act of the imagination of making a concept from an empirical intuition is *comprehensio*. *Apprehension* of the imagination, *apperceptio æsthetica*. Its *comprehension*, *comprehensio æsthetica* (aesthetic conceptualizing [*ästhetisches Begreifen*]): I comprehend (*fasse zusammen*) the manifold in a whole representation and so the representation receives a certain form. (KGS XVIII §5661)

...only under these conditions [of thought] . . . can we have experience of objects; and consequently if intuition (of objects of appearance) did not agree with these conditions, objects would be nothing for us, that is, not objects of *knowledge* at all . . . All *data* of the senses for a possible cognition would

never, without those conditions, represent objects. They would not even reach that unity of consciousness that is necessary for knowledge of myself (as object of inner senses). I would not even be able to know that I have [such data]; consequently for me, as a knowing being, they would be absolutely nothing. They could still (if I imagine myself to be an animal) carry on their play in an orderly fashion, as representations connected according to empirical laws of association . . . This might be so without my knowing the slightest thing thereby, not even what my own condition is. (Letter to Herz of May 1789)

[A]nimals too have *apprehensiones*, but not *apperceptiones*; hence, they cannot make their representations universal. (KGS XV §411, after 1770)

Since time is only the form of intuition, and thence the form of objects as appearances, that in appearances which corresponds to sensation is thus the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves (thing-ness [*Sachheit*], reality). (A143/B182)

That in representation which is related to the object of the senses in itself is sensation; but since the representation is there related merely to the subject (according to its quality), the object is a mere something in general. Were I to take away this something (sensation) and also the composition, there then is left the form of intuition and the object as appearance (*Erscheinung*). (Sensations related to the object constitute illusion [*Schein*].) (KGS XVIII §6314, 1790-1, emphasis mine)

[Eberhard] has asked, 'who (what) gives sensibility its material (*Stoff*), namely sensations?,' believing himself to be contradicting the *Critique*, since he [elsewhere] says: 'choose what we may, we come to *things in themselves*.' Now, this is exactly what is the constant contention of the *Critique*; only it places the ground of the material of sensory intuition not again in things as objects of the senses themselves, but in something supersensible, which underlies these objects, and of which we can have no cognition. It says: the objects as things in themselves *give* the material to empirical intuitions (they contain the ground of the determination of the faculty of representation conformably to its sensibility), but *are* not that material. (*On A Discovery*, Ak 215)

That I myself have given to my theory the name of transcendental idealism cannot justify confounding it with the empirical idealism of Descartes . . . or the mystical, fantastical idealism of Berkeley... What I called idealism concerned not the existence of things (*Sachen*), the doubting of which actually constitutes idealism in the received signification; for this it never occurred to me to doubt. Rather, it concerned merely sensory representation, to which above all space and time belong. About these, and thence in general all *appearances*, I have shown that they are not things (*Sachen*), nor determinations belonging to things in themselves, but mere modes of representation. (*Prolegomena*, Pt. I, remark 3)

I speak of ideality in reference to the *form of representations*; but [Eberhard and Garve] interprets this to mean ideality with respect to the *matter*, that is, the ideality of the *object* and its very existence. (letter to Beck, 4 December, 1792)

The field of *obscure* representations is thus the greatest of all in man. — But because they are perceptible only in his passive aspect as a play of sensations, they belong to the theory not of pragmatic but physiological anthropology. (*Anthropology* §5)

The opposite of attention is negatively an absence of thought (*Gedankenlosigkeit*) and positively a scattering (*Zerstreuung/ dissipatio*). (KGS XV §165)

Abstraction is not a mere neglect and omission, for that would be scattering (*Zerstreuung/distractio*), but an actual act of the cognitive faculty whereby a representation of which I am aware (*mir bewußt*) is kept away from combination with others in a consciousness. (*Anthropology* §3)

The consciousness of perception relates all perception only to ourselves as modifications of our state; they are then separate among themselves (*unter sich getrennt*) and especially not cognitions of a thing and related to any object. (*KGS XVIII* §5923, 1783-4)

A representation is clear in which the consciousness suffices for the *consciousness of the difference* of the representation from others. If it suffices for difference, but not consciousness of the difference, then the representation must be called obscure. Clearness is not, as the logicians say, the consciousness of a representation. For a certain degree of consciousness, insufficient for recollection, must be met with in many obscure representations, since, in the absence of all consciousness, we would make no distinction in the combination of obscure representations, which we yet are indeed able to do in the case of the marks of many concepts (as in that of right or equity, and when the musician sustains many notes at once during improvisation). (B414n.)

The senses do not confuse. Of one who has *apprehended* (*aufgefaßt*), but *not yet ordered*, a given manifold, we cannot say that he *confuses* it. Perceptions of the senses (empirical representations with conscious-ness) can only be called inner *appearances*. The understanding, which comes to these perceptions and combines them under a rule of thought (introduces *order* into the manifold), is what first makes empirical cognitions of them, i.e. *experience*. It is therefore *understanding*, being neglectful of its obligation when it judges hastily, without first having ordered representations of the senses according to concepts, that then complains of the confusion, for which it holds man's sensible nature culpable . . . (*Anthropology* §9) *The senses do not deceive.* This is the denial of the most important, but also the most null reproach made against the senses. And this is not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all.) (*Anthropology* §11)

Obscure representations are pregnant with clear. Moral: only [need to] bring clarity into them. The midwife of thought. All *actus* of the understanding and reason can take place in obscurity. (*KGS XV* §177, 1760s)